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The Australian experience suggests  that antidumping  is, at heart.
about safeguarding the interests of particular industries. As long
as this is true, there will always be tension between antidumping
policy and the broader interests of the national economy and the
world trading systems.
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One side of the debate on antidumping argues that dumping  process in Australia. In particuiar it has tightened up on
is not a problem in intemational trade - that it is a normal  how the injury test is implemented and has given a second
business practice that benefits the importing country's  pass at "normal value" arithmetic.  Several times its
consumers and user industries - and that antidumping is  assessments have diffcred from those of Customs - in a
inherently protectionist.  direction more sympathetic to the foreign importer. But
The other side argues that an anti-dumping system has  that may have more to do with the govenmment's  current
a legitimate role to play in maintaining a liberal trading  attitude than with the institutional innovation itself.
order, but that the process is being abused for protectionist  The ADA operates within the same industry-specific
ends.  framework as the Customs Service but is more attuned to
Gary Banks uses Australia's experience in the last  the political environment in which technical decisions are
decade to shine light on the issue.  made.  But that can cut both ways.
Antidumping is a complex process with many rules  The antidumping system retains a degree of adminis-
that, depending on interpretation or minor changes, can  trative or ministerial discretion that will always make it
have important effects on the fortunes of home industries.  vulnerable to the business and political cycles.  That is true
This means that the system and how it operates will remain  whatever the country.  The Australian government has at
of abiding interest to import-competing industries. Lobby-  least wrestled publicly with the issues to arrive at a more
ing for rule changes or favorable interpretations will  precise, objective position.
continue as long as the expected retums from such lobbying  But on the three touchstones of the antidumping
exceed the costs.  Whether or not antidumping serves as a  process - defrnitions of normal values, material injury, and
protectionist device in Australia, says Banks, industry sees  causality - arbitrary judgments will always need to be
it in that role.  made at many points. These judgments will inevitably be
It is difficult for industries to get the conventional  colored by the political and economic climate of the day.
border protection that was common 10 years ago. Under  Compared with the early 1  980s, says Banks, that climate is
trade liberalization, "protection" has become a discredited  currently relatively "dry" - but that can change again.
concept in Australia.  But in the United States and else-  The evidence from Australia's experience, says Banks,
where, "faimess" is always popular - and antidumping  suggests that dumping may be a problem in intemational
(the very term) is seen as being about achieving faimess.  trade but that antidumping presents even greater problems.
It is the "low-track" route for getting protection against  Tinkering with the procedures and criteria for taking
imports. It takes place according to rules and procedures  antidumping action can help reduce its protectionist
that industry and specialist consultants soon master, away  tendencies somewhat (though such changes are reversible).
from the public glare.  More "high-track" routes are more  But it does not resolve the fundamental problem that
costly and more likely to meet persuasive opposition.  antidumping is at heart about safeguarding the interests of
The demand for antidumping as a protectionist device  particular industries. As long as this remains the objective,
will continue and can be expected to rise when times "get  there will always be tension between antidumping policy
tough," says Banks.  and the broader interests of the national economy and the
Australia's new Anti-Dumping Authority (ADA) has  world trading system.
brought a fresh and more critical eye to the antidumping
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In  1923, Jacob Viner, the eminent American economist, published a book called
Dumping:  A Problem  in International  Trade.  Viner  defined  dumping  as 'sales for export
at lower  prices  than  those  charged  at the same  time and under  like  circumstances  to buyers
for the domestic  market',  and his book was concerned  with the circumstances  in which
dumping  was likely  to take  place  and be harmful  or beneficial  to the importing  country.
At the time when Viner was addressing  the topic, there had been some experience of
dumping in world trade, but very little experience with anti-dumping action. That
situation has changed. Indeed, given the concerns now being raised in national and
international  forums,  it is likely  that if Professor  Viner  were re-writing  his book today he
would  have  substituted  anti-dumping  for dumping  in its title.
All industrial  countries, and an increasing  number  of developing  countries,  have anti-
dumping  legislation.  In most cases  that  legislation  is based  on internationally  agreed  rules
and  procedures  under  the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade (GATT),  rules which
were  themselves  initially  based  on US legislation  from the 1920s.
Dkimping,  unlike the government subsidisation  of exports, is an activity initiated by
private firms  and is not 'illegal'  in GATT  terms.  Article  VI of the General  Agreement  -
the original anti-dumping text, to which a Code was added in  1967 - states that
'dumping  ... is to be condemned  if it causes or threatens  material  injury'  to an industry  in
the importing  country.  There is thus an ambivalence  in GATT rules on (anti) dumping
which  does not arise in most other areas. That ambivalence  reflects (a) recognition  that
dumping  is a source  of cheaper  imports,  which  are normally  beneficial  to the importiag
economy, and (b) an awareness that anti-dumping action has the potential to be an
alternative  means  of protecting  industries  against  (legitimate)  world  market  competition.
The GAIT rules on anti-dumping  consist mainly of procedural  and other constraints
designed  to ensure  that any action  is  justified  and seen to be so. (Though  there is nothing
in the GATT  rules which requires  anti-dumping  action to be taken when the criteria are
met.) T'here  are essentially  three hurdles which the GA  t .1  greements  place before a2
government  contemplating  anti-dumping  action: first, 'dumping'  - sales at less than
'normal value'-  must be found to have taken place; second,  a domestic  industry  must
be shown to have suffered  'material  injury'; and third, that injury must be found to be
attributable  to the dumping  in question.
To each of these hurdles  is appended  a myriad  of interpretative  definitions  and criteria  -
not least to do with the meaning  of the key terms  'normal  value',  'material  injury'  and the
establishment  of 'causality'.  The Anti-dumping  Code  of 1967 was largely  a 'ned at tying
down these  concepts  and tightening  procedures,  out of concem  that the looseness  of the
original  GATT requirements  was allowing  anti-dumping  to develop as a protectionist
device.
The pr,sent debate  about  anti-dumping  can be divided  into two.
rFirst,  there are those  who argue  that dumping  is not a problem  in intemational  trade
- that it is a normal business practice which benefits the importing country's
consumers  and user  industries  - and that  anti-dumping  is inherently  protectionist.
*  S.econd,  there are those who believe that an anti-dumping  system has a legitimate
role to play in maintaining  a liberal  trading  order,  but that the  process  is being abused
for protectionist  ends.
Three sets of conclusions  about reforms to anti-dumping  have emerged  from this dual
debate:
- tighten  anti-dumping  procedures  to reduce  scope  for abuse
- broaden  their  focus,  to take  into account  wider  economic  interests
- abandon anti-dumping altogether.
The purpose  of this paper is to use the Australian  experience  over the past decade  - a
period  rich in anti-dumping  activity  under  different  procedures  and institutions  - to shine
some light on the issues raised internationally.  (Countervailing  duty procedures,  which
are similar to those for anti-dumping,  are not dealt with here.) It is not a comparative
study,  though  at times  international  comparisons  will be made.3
The paper begins by briefly outlining the varied history of Australia's anti-dumping
anrangements  and activity  since  the late 1970s.  It then  looks at the Australian  experience
from the perspectives of the debate just referred to and ends with some conclusions
relevant  to that debate.4
II.  A BRIEF  HISTORY
Anti-dumping  provisions  were  first contained  in Australian  legislation  in 1901,  at the time
of federation. In 1906, measures  were enacted to address 'predatory dumping'.  but in
1921  the Customs  Tariff (Industries  Preservation)  Act established  broader  procedures  for
the imposition  of penalty  duties  on imports  deemed  to have been  sold at prices  lower  than
in their suppliers'  home markets.  This legislation  was similar  to that enacted  in Canada
and the United States (Dale, 1980).  In the Australian  system,  Parliament  delegates  the
power  to take anti-dumping  action  to the Minister  with  responsibility  for customs  matters.
Present  legislation  is a much  amended  form of the Customs  Tariff (Anti-dumping)  Act of
1975,  which  was introduced  to implement  the GATT  Anti-dumping  Code  of 1967  and it
displaced  most preceding  anti-dumping  legislation.  A distinctive  feature  of the Australian
procedures  until 1984,  was provision  for appeal  to the Industries  Assistance  Commission
([AC)  - a statutory  authority  of the Australi.an  Govemment  with the role of reporting  on
and advising government  about industry  assistance  from an economy-wide  perspective
(box 1).
The 1975  Act appears  to have had  little effect  on the incidence  or extent  of anti-dumping
actions, which remained steRdy  at levels comparable  to those in earlier years. In the
words  of Gruen  (1986),  'prior  to the 1980s  the dumping  arena in Australia  was relatively
quiet and noni-controversial'  (p.8).
Take-off:  the early  1980s
In the early 1980s,  anti-dumping  activity  increased  rapidly  (see figure 1). This  reflected  a
combination  of factors (discussed  in chapter IV) among which the global and national
recessions, combined with a rising Australian dollar, and the increased difficulty of
obtaining industry assistance through conventional  means were important. Pressure
mounted  for the government  to take tougher r stion against low priced imports. That
pressure  led to some  significant  legislative  changes  in the early 1980s.5
Box  1: The IAC:  A unique  institution
A sidelight  to the anti-dumping  story  in Australia  is the role  played  by the Industries  Assistance
Commission  (AC) in the anti-dumping  process.
The IAC was created  by Act of Parliament  in 1973 to do something  which at the time was
novel in the Australian  industry policy environment  (and indeed that of any other country),
namely:
*  to advise the government,  in publicly available reports, about the effects on national
economic  welfare  of any  proposals  to assist  industry;  and
*  to inform  the general  community  (consumers,  enterprises,  the media)  about  the existence
and economic  effects  of all measures  in place.
The IAC was carefully  designed  to ensure that its advice was impartial and of high quality.
And the IAC has played an important role in paving the way for trade liberalisation  and
microeconomnic  reform in Australia. In addition to being independent and open in its
operations,  a unique feature of the IAC was the set of legislative  guidelines  for its advice.
These were: 'improving  the efficiency  with which the economy  uses its resources;  ensuring  a
consistent  ind 1istry policy;  taking  account  of consumers  and users of products  affected  by the
Commission's  proposals,  and providing  for public scrutiny  of assistance  measures'  (Rattigan,
1988,  p. 13).
These economy-wide  criteria for evaluating  industry protection  created a point of tension,
however, in the IAC's handling of anti-dumping  qiuestions  and its involvement in anti-
dumping  has been  progressively  reduced  over the  ycr..s:
*  At first, the IAC conducted, as a matter of course, investigations  into whether anti-
dumping  criteria  were  met.
*  In 1975 it lost this central role and instead became an appeal body on anti-dumping
matters.
*  In 1984,  the IAC Act was amended  to provide  that IAC  judgments  in such appeals  were
to be confined to 'the facts' - the Commission  was specifically  instructed to ignore
economy-wide  considerations.
*  Finally,  in 1988  the IAC lost its 'court  of appeal'  function  and was  withdrawn  altogether
from any formal  involvement  in the anti-dumping  process.
The IACs disconnection  from anti-dumping  system underlines  the fact that anti-dumping
occupies  a special  place in industry  protection  policy.  It has been and remains  concemed  with
industry specific injury and takes no account of the effects on consumers and industry
generally  of remedying  that injury  through  higher  import  duties.6
Figure  1: The  anti-dumping  take-off
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Legislative  changes
In 1982-83  there were a number  of amendments  to the Act which facilitated  the use of
anti-dumping  action.  These  included:
- the removal  of some  appeal  provisions  (relating  to t;  I imposition  of cash securities)
and the streamlining  of others  (access  to the Federal  Court),
- the removal  of section 14 of the Act, which  obliged the Minister  not to take action
'inconsistent  with Australia's  intemational  obligations',
- and, consistent with the Tokyo Round revisions to the Code, removal of the
requirement  for dumped  imports  to be the 'principal'  cause  of material  injury.
Then, following a change in  government in  1983, the incoming Minister with
responsibility  for anti-dumping  ordered  a departmental  review  of the process, observing7
that 'the Government  is determined  to ensure  that the protection  afforded  industry  is not
undermined'  (IAC 1984).  The main areas  of legislative  change  in 1984  related  to:
- Sales at a loss: The administration  had adopted the practice of excluding prices
charged by exporters  in their domestic  markets when those sales were made at a
loss, for the purpose of determining  normal  values (of which more later).  This was
regularised  by additions  to the legislation  (section  5(9)).
- Material  injury:  An indicative  list of elements  for judging  material  injury  was added
to the legislation.
- IAC reviews:  The IAC  was relieved  of its statutory  obligation,  when reviewing  anti-
dumping  mattxrs,  to refer  to its economy-wide  policy  guidelines.  The amended  IAC
legisla.don  provided  that such  reviews  simply  be confined  to 'the facts'.
- Monitoring:  Administrative  changes  were also mad_.  to expedite  and facilitate  the
anti-dumping  process.
These  changes  were  interpreted  by a number  of A  ustralia's  trading  partners  as making  the
anti-durnping  process  a more protectionist  instrument.  (GATT,  1984)
Domestic conflict
Within Australia,  too, concerns were being  voiced  about the direction  taken by the anti-
dumping process. In a 1985 draft report on assistance to the chemicals and plastics
industries, the IAC described ways in which anti-dumping  procedures  were imposing
costs on user  industries  and the  economy  generally,  noting  the high incidence  and  country
coverage  of anti-dumping  action  in that sector. The IAC warned  of the potential  for the
anti-dumping system to countermand the government's goal of reducing industry
protection  and recommended  that any future  decisions  on anti-dumping  for the industry
should  reflect  national  interest  considerations.
The capacity of anti-dumping  action to impose  costs on user industries  was forcefully
demonstrated  a short time after by a case which  triggered  a new  review  of anti-dumping
and esntually  resulted in the revised  scheme  which  operates i.day. That case involved8
certain  fertilisers  - again part of the chemicals  sector.  The sequence  of that dispute  was
as follows:
*  Following  a long overdue review, anti-dumping  actions  on nitrogenous  fertilisers
were  revoked  in April 1984,  benefiting  the fanming  sector.
*  In October 1985, the IAC recommended  the termination  of fertiliser subsidies  to
farmners  - subsequently  accepted  by government.
*  But in December  1985,  dumping  duties  were  re-imposed  on certain  fertdlisers.
*  A severe  political  backlash  forced  the government  to provide  farmers  with temporary
payments  to offset  the cost burden  caused  by the imposition  of anti-dumping  duties,
until reviews of the industry and the whole anti-dumping process could be
conducted.
The  Gruen  Review
In February 1986, Fred Gruen, a Professor of Economics at the Australian National
University,  was appointed by the government  to undertake that review, with terms of
reference  requiring  him to report  on:
*  whether,  in  the  light  of  the  GATT  Code and other  relevant  agreements,
improvements  to the Act could be made and, if so, to recommend appropriate
changes;
*  whether  'consideration  should  be given  to the merits  of including  a National  Interest
provision as a condition for the purposes of decisions  to impose  duties...' (Gruen
1986, p.A3).
That review had considerable influence on subsequent changes to  anti-dumping
procedures  and on perceptions  about how the scheme had operated in the past, and is
therefore  worth looking  at in some  detail.9
Gruen, aided by a departmental secretariat, received some 130 submissions from industry
associations, trade unions, private  firms and government authorities, as well as from
foreign governments.  Meetings were  held throughout the country. The Review was
prepared against a tight deadline and released in April 1986. It focused on the operation of
the anti-dumping process in Australia since 1980. Gruen was critical of a number of ways
in which the scheme had operated during that period. In a summary to his report he began
by observing that:
Australia  makes greater use of anti-dumping  action than do other comparable  countries.
Such  extensive  use of anti-dumping  action  has the potential  to frustrate  the achievement  of
other  govemment  objectives  in the industry,  trade,  competition  and economic  policy areas.
(p.iii)
He observed that it is 'normally in the importing country's overall economic interest to
take the external trading environment as given and accept cheap imports, even if they are
dumped or subsidised'. However, he also concluded that the principle of 'fairness' in
international  trade, which  stands behind anti-dumping policies,  is widely supported
throughout the Australian community. And he noted that:
[The] commitment  to a speedy and readily available  anti-dumping  system underpins the
existing  fragile  consensus  between  Govemrnment,  industry  and unions  on the need  for change
towards  a less assisted,  more  outward-looking,  restructured  industry.
Gruen therefore recommended that the existing system be continued,  subject to some
substantial changes designed to:
(a)  reduce  the discrepancy  between  the concept  of 'unfair  trading  practices'  as it is applied
within  Australia  and as it is applied  by Australia  to its imports  of goods;  and
(b)  discourage  too extensive  use of the anti-dumping  system as a more readily available
system  for restricting  imports.  (p.iv)
Gruen's recommendations were largely based on his investigations into three key issues:
the assessment of 'fair prices'; material injury and the causal link with dumped imports;
and the question of a 'national interest' provision.10
Assessment  of 'fair  prices'
Gruen  was critical of Australia's  increased  propensity,  shared with the other main anti-
dumping  countries,  to use cost estimates  instead  of market  prices  for determining  normal
values.  In particular,  he criticised  the practice  of rejecting  exporters'  local prices where
they do not cover all costs - resulting in  'declared normal prices which can be
substantially  above the actual domestic market price'. He therefore recomniended  the
repeal of section 5(9) of the Act, concerning  sales at a loss, and urged that where no
domestic price data were available,  representative  prices for comparable  goods sold to
third markets should be used, with constructed values used 'only when there is no
conceivable  alternative'.
Material  injury
Gruen  observed  that, while  the tests for material  injury  in anti-dumping  cases in Australia
are equivalent  to those  used  in assessing  cases  for emergency  assistance  (based  on GALT
Article XIX),  the 'Customs  Service  is prepared  to reach a positive  preliminary  finding  in
a dumping  case  on evidence  of lesser  injury than is the Department  in assessing  a prima
facie case for emergency  assistance'.  He concluded:  'At present  the injury  test is operated
on the basis that  virtually  any injury  caused  by dumping  is unacceptable'  (p.30).
He recommended  in his report  that:
- price  effects  by themselves  should  not be sufficient  evidence  of injury;
- a 'substantial  effort' should  be made to allow for the influence  of factors other than
dumping  in causing  injury;  and
- injury must be seen in  the context of the 'entire operations of the relevant
establishment'  (p.32).
A 'national  interest'  provision
As indicated  previously,  the Gruen  review  was precipitated  by conflict  between  producers
seeking  action against  (dumped)  imports  on the one side and the users of the products
concerned  on the other  - and by general  dissatisfaction  with procedures  which  only took11
the interests of the former group into account. The IAC had argued in its Chemicals  report
that anti-dumping action should only be taken when it is in the 'national interest'. The
government had expressly asked Professor Gruen whether such a provision should be
included in the legislation. Gruen decided, largely on 'practicality' grounds, that it should
not:
The addition  of a 'national  interest'  clause must add to the uncertainty  of the proceedings
and to administrative  complexity and would increase costs of investigation  to both the
participants  and the  Government.  It would  also expose  the Minister  - and the Department
- to intensive  lobbying  on individual  dumping  decisions.  (p.36)
Legislative  response  to the Gruen  Report
In announcing its decision on the Gruen Report in October 1986, the government said
that if Australia was to rationalise protection it was essential that manufacturers were not
subject to injury from products imported at prices below those at which they are sold in
the country of origin.  The Government further promised that it was not prepared to
provide Australian industry with 'a lesser safeguard against unfair competition' (emphasis
added) than that provided by the US, Canada and the EC.  However, it also implied that
in  the past  the anti-dumping process had exceeded  its charter  and expressed  a new
determination that anti-dumping not be used as an alternative form of industry protection.
The  government's  response  was implemented  through  a package  of  legislation  -
involving amendments to existing legislation and a new Act - which made the following
changes to the anti-dumping system.
Creation  of an Anti-dumping  Authority
This,  one  of the major changes,  was not proposed  or even discussed  in  the Gruen
Report. The Anti-dumping Authority (ADA) was established by separate legislation as a
new, independent authority with the functions of:
- recommending to the Minister whether anti-dumping or countervailing duties should
be imposed; and12
- providing  the Minister  with advice  on anti-dumping  issues  in general.
The first of these roles (and implicitly the second) was previously assigned to the
Australian Customs  Service (ACS),  with provision for review by the IAC. Apart from
administering  anti-dumping measures, the ACS's role is now confined to obtaining
preliminary findings; after that it may be called upon to assist the ADA in obtaining
information  needed  by that body. And, as noted previously,  the IACs formal role in the
anti-dumping  process  was terninated. (The  current procedural  steps are set out in figure
2) The Act provides  for the responsible  Minister  to issue directions  to the ADA,  with the
aim of ensuring  that the Authority  'is guided  by the current industry  policy  objectives  of
the governmentf  in its interpretation  of the legislation.  The government  made it clear that
tests for demonstrating  'material  injury'  at-d  causality  would be tightened  through  such
guidelines.
Sales at a loss and constructed  normal values
The government,  while rejecting  Gruen's  recommendation  that section  5(9) be removed
(relating to the invalidity  of normal values based on domestic prices where sales are
consistently made at a loss) altered the legislation to the effect that in this and other
circumstances,  constructed  normal  values should  include a profit only in circumstances
that were subsequently to be specified in regulations - with the presumption that
otherwise  a zero  profit  was to be imputed.
National interest
The government  rejected  the inclusicn  of a national  interest  provision  in the legislation  for
much the same reasons as Professor  Gruen. ('Proceedings  could become  unnecessarily
complex  and protracted.')  However,  it made it explicit  that the Minister  had the power  to
take national  interest criteria  into account  in exercising  his discretion  when considering
ADA  reports.13
Sunset clause
The government  introduced  a three year sunset  clause,  'consistent  with its intention that
anti-dumping  and countervailing  measures  do not become  a substitute  form of ongoing
assistance'  (Jones 1988,  p.23 12).  This applies  to actions against  commodities,  regardless
of the time  profile  of actions  against  the particular  exporters  involved.
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IAC's role eliminated
The IAC  Act was amended  to remove  that  body as a place  of review  on dumping  matters.
That function  is now  performed  by the ADA itself.
Lodging a complaint
The new legislation  contains specific  provisions to make it clear that an anti-dumping
complaint  may be made by any person  on behalf of the Australian  industry  affected (or
likely  to be affected).
Statutory  time limits
For the first time,  specific  time limits were provided  for the different  stages  of the anti-
dumping  process: 55 days for establishment  of a prima facie case; 120 days to make a
preliminary  finding and, in the event of a positive preliminary  finding, 120  days for a
final finding.
Industry  fights back
Manufacturing  interests wasted  little time in showing  their  dissatisfaction  with the 1988
legislation. The Australian Chamber of Manufactures  (ACM) soon formed an Anti-
dumping  Task Force  drawn  from a number  of national  industry  associations.  The ACM
put its case in terms of what it saw as 'fewer  safeguards'  in the new anti-dumping  system
than existed  overseas.  The Task Force argued  that there should  be another  review  of the
legislation and that, in the meantime,  the government  should  consult with industry  'to
ensure the current legislation operates effectively' (Stubbs 1989). The ACM further
demanded  that:
Regulations  and  directions  should  be  made  iumediatey  to:-
Expunge  any thought,  as expressed  in the Minister's  second  reading  speech,  that
industry  needs to be threatened  with being 'knocked  out' before anti-dumping
measures  are  applied.15
*  Include  a profit  component  [not  less  than  8 per  cent]  when  constructed  nonnal  values
are  used  for fair  prices.
*  Provide  interim  action  after  55 days  [instead  of the 180  days  in legislation].
*  Remove  Ministerial  discretion  [to reject or amend  an ADA recommendation  on
'national  interest'  grounds]  (Stubbs  1989).
The last two demands  have fallen  on deaf ears thus far (although  a review  of the revised
anti-dumping  will be undertaken  sometime  after September  1991). The other demands,
however,  were considered  in the context of a November 1988  report to the Minister  by
the Anti-dumping  Authority.
The  ADA  review  of three  key  issues
The Minister  sought the ADA's advice about what administrative  guidelines  should be
given on three aspects  of anti-dumping  procedure/criteria  which had not been precisely
spelt  out  in the legislation:
(i)  what constitutes  'material  injury';
(ii)  what is the appropriate  'extended  period of time'  beyond which domestic  sales at a
loss cannot  be used  for normal  values;  and
(iii) when  a profit  element  should  be included  in a constructed  normal  value.
These  matters  are discussed  in some  detail  in a later  chapter.  Suffice  it here  to note  that  the
ADA recommendations  brought  greater scope  for taking anti-dumping  action than the
Minister's  statements  had previously  indicated  would  apply  (especially  in relation to the
inclusion  of an imputed profit in constructed  normal values, and the injury test). The
changes,  reflected  in regulations  and legislation  in October  and  December  1989,  appear  to
have  been  accepted  by the Australian  Chamber  of Manufactures  for the time being.16
111.  ANTI-DUMPING  IN PRINCIPLE
A fundamental  question is whether anti-dumping  action is ever justifiable in a liberal
trading  order. A number  of economists,  as opposed to policy makers and lawyers (and
just about everybody  else), have argued  that it is not; that anti-dumping  is inherently
protectionist  and should  be thought  of in the same  way as other  forms of protection  - as
just another  device  for assisting  domestic  industry  against  competition  from imports  (see,
for example,  Stegemann  1980,  Finger  and Murray 1989).
If we took the definition  of protection  as 'barriers  to imports  which  assist a local industry
to maintain  a level of activity which it could not otherwise  sustain',  then anti-dumping
action  obviously could be classified  as 'protectionist.  On the other hand, if we think itt
terms of an international  trading system  in which  GATT has set the rules about what is
and is not permissible,  then the fact that anti-dumping  is permitted  would mean that it
cannot  be protectionist  by definition.
Such semantics  do not get us very far. The real question  is whether  dumping  is harmful
to national economies - and the intemational economy - in the long term. If it is, the
case  for an anti-dumping  system  then  depends  on whether, :ch  a system  can improve  the
situation.  This chapter addresses  the first issue,  the next  chapter  addresses  the second.
The question  of what 'harm' dumping  does, can be looked  at from two perspectives-
the (narrowly)  economic  and what might be called  the 'systemic'.
The  economic  case
Considering  first the dumping exporter's  home country,  it is sometimes  suggested  that
dumping  in itself imposes  costs on the local economy.  However,  this confuses  dumping
with subsidised exports.  The latter, if they involve net subsidies  - and putting to one
side 'strategic  trade' issues  - generally  do impose  costs by distorting  the allocation  of
resources in the exporting  country.  However,  dumping  is quite different in nature from
subsidised  export pricing. It is done by a private firm as part of a profit maximising  (or17
loss minimising)  strategy  and, assuming  that  private  firms  know what  is in their own  best
interests - and that their decisions are not distorted by govemment interventions - it
will also be in the interests of the dumping firm's economy. (In practice,  'dumping' is
commonly  a side-effect  of domestic  interventions  which serve  to protect the exporter's
domestic  market  from  world competition,  keeping  home  prices  high  - but the reai source
of economic  costs  are the interventions,  not dumping  as such.)
The question of costs is usually focused on the recipient country. Normally, lower priced
imports  benefit an economy  - allowing  consumption  gains from lower prices, and the
reallocation of resources into areas of comparative advantage. In other words, they
increase  the 'gains from trade'.  The theoretical  literature  on dumping,  which  began with
Viner, has identified two circumstances  in which countries  may not gain from lower
priced  imports:  'predatory'  pricing  and intermittent  dumping.
Predatory pricing
One possibility,  often raised by industry  in support of anti-dumping  measures,  is that
dumping  may be part of a foreign  supplier's strategy  to drive local suppliers out of the
market; having eliminated the competition,  prices could then be raised to monopoly
levels.  For the foreign  exporter,  the long term monopolist  gains more than make up for
the short term dumping losses.  For the recipient  country,  however.  the consumers'  short
term gains  from lower  prices are eventually  outweighed  by the losses  from higher  prices
in the long term than would have obtained if the domestic industry had remained in
business.
While this argument may have some superficial appeal, the conditions required for
successful  predation  are stringent.  For example,  there must be only one foreign  supplier
(a world trading monopolist  or sustainable  cartel);  otherwise  any attempt to raise prices
after the local competitor's  demise  will attract  other  import  competition.  And, in the same
way, there  would  need to be good  reasons  why  the locals themselves  could not profitably
re-enter  the market  once prices again reached  levels at which domestic  supply  had been
profitable before.  And even where the appropriate  conditions  for successful  predation
exist, there would  be other  less costly strategies  available  to foreign  firms than a drawn-
out price war (such  as collusion  with,  or acquisition  of, the local supplier).18
The theoretical  esotericism  of predatory  dumping  seems  confinned by the rarity of such
cases  in practice.  (Dale, 1980)
In Australia,  with all the dumping  activity  that  has been  officially  detected,  there  appears
to be no evidence that any of this was part of a predatory  strategy.  (Gruen  comments  at
one point that 'There  have been  instances  where  exporters'  pricing  decisions  in Australia
appear to reflect a predatory element', but this is not documented.) The fact that
Australia's  imports  of nearly  all commodities  come from a range of suppliers  in different
countries  eliminates  a fundamental  condition  for the rational  pursuit  of such  a strategy.
Moreover,  a substantial  number  of anti-dumping  actions themselves  involve  more than
one supplier.  For example,  of the 47 anti-dumping  actions  that were brought  to an end in
1988-89  (mostly  under  the new sunset  clause),  37 involved  suppliers  from more  than one
foreign  country.
The view that predation  is not seriously  seen as the raison  d'etre for anti-dumping  action
is also supported  by the absence  from Australia's  anti-dumping  laws (and from GATT
rules)  of any  requirement  to prove  or disprove  predatory  intent.
Intermittent  dumping
Of greater relevance is the argument  that dumping may bring net losses to a country
because  of its internittent nature.  Viner (1923)  identified  a number  of circumstances  in
which this might occur. The argument is essentially that foreign companies may
sometimes  treat their export sales as a surplus  disposal  medium.  It is suggested  that  for a
small economy like Australia's, even a one-off dump could wipe out an industry, or
major sections  of it.
Like the case of trade liberalisation, the net costs or benefits to an economy from
intermittent  dumping  depend  on a comparison  of the economy-wide  benefits  from lower
prices and the industry-specilic  production losses. The difference is in the temporary
nature  of the price reductions  under  intermittent  dumping.  The more temporary  the price
reduction,  the greater  the possibility  that  adjustment  costs could  exceed the consumption19
gains. However, it is also likely that any reasonably competitive  domestic firm could
weather  such  temporary  phenomena.
In practice  it is difficult  to devise a scheme  which  could overcome  intermittent  dumping.
While GATT rules and Australian  iegislation  contain a prospective  element ('causes  or
threatens material injury') it would be difficult in most circumstances  for a domestic
industry to know that a one-off shipment at dumped prices was happening in advance of
it actually arriving.  And the lags in getting  to a preliminary  finding  would  mean that the
injury  may well have  already  occurred  before any action  could be taken.  It would  in any
case be very difficult  for anti-dumping  administrators  to determine  the likely  duration  of
dumping.
The Australian  legislation  (again  consistent  with the GAIT) does  not require  any  evidence
about  the duration  of dumping  or the reason  why  it has occurred.  If anything,  it is geared
toward finding  and dealing with dumping  of a more continuous  kind.  This is illustrated
by table 1,  which shows  that  the average  anti-dumping  action,  prior to the introduction  of
the three year sunset clause, lasted around four and a half years - with the longest
actions attaining  a duration  of close to ten y' tars. (Though,  as discussed  later, this may
also have  resulted  from an inadequate  review  process.)
Table  1: Duration  of anti-dumping  actions
Number of
Year  actions  terminated  Average duration  (years)  Longest duration  (years)
1984-85  13  4.8  7.2
1985-86  50  4.3  9.6
1986-87  60  3.6  8.3
1987-88  66  5.3  8.8
1988-89  43  5.2  9.7
Source:  Austualian  Customs  Service.
While there may be a theoretical case that in certain circumstances intermittent  or
temporary  dumping  could reduce the welfare  of the importing  country, there is no such
case where dumping is a  continuing phenomenon. Long term dumping brings gains to
consumers  and user  industries  which could be  expected  to outweigh  any  losses in20
production  within  the import-competing  industry.  Given  the relatively  lengthy  application
of anti-dumping  duties in Australia (even the three year sunset  clause goes beyond the
sort of temporary  dumping  that might impose  net costs) it might have  been  expected  that
doubts  would  be raised in this country  about  whether  anti-dumping  action  has been  in the
'national  interest'.
Economy-wide  effects
Recall that the Gruen Review was triggered  by an acute awareness  that anti-dumping
action against imported fertilisers, while undoubtedly benefiting the local fertiliser
industry, was imposing substantial  costs on the much larger and economically more
important farm sector. But Australia's anti-dumping procedures, like those of other
countries, exclude any detailed consideration of the effects that dumping and anti-
dumping  have on the broader  community.  Concern  is focused  solely on the question of
injury to a particular  industry.  The larger question  of whether  the avoidance  of industry-
specific injury might give rise to a greater injury to the economy as a whole is not
considered.
The questioli  of whether  dumping  reduces  the national  welfare  of the importing  country
requires a wider investigation  of effects  than  just on the industry  directly  involved.  Yet
the Australian  legislation  - in common  with that of other countries  and consistent  with
the explicit intentions  of the GATT  - makes no provision for such an economy-wide
perspective.
In a submission to the Gruen Review, the Chairman of the Industries Assistance
Commission  drew attention  to this anomaly:
The  benefits  of anti-dumping  action  accrue  to import-competing  producers  (including  their
employees,  and  dependent  input  suppliers)  while  the  direct  costs  are incurred  by domestic
user industries  and  consumers.  To serve  community-wide  interests,  as opposed  to the
interests  of a particular  group,  it would  be necessary  for provision  to be made to take
account  of the  competing  interests  of these  groups.  (Cannichael  1986,  p.14)21
The  Chairman of  the IAC proposed two alternative changes to  administrative
arrangements  which  would  facilitate  this broader  'national  interest'  perspective:
*  Require  Customs  to make  recommendations  to the Minister  based  upon  broadened  criteria,
with  provision  for appeal  to the IAC  on all grounds  including  consideration  of the wider
interests.
*  Require  Customs  to determine  whether  a prima  facie  case  exists  with  reference  to broadened
criteria  and  refer  such  cases  to an independent  authority  for  assessment.  (p.17)
Gruen included the second proposal among four alternative ways of allowing for
'national interest' considerations in anti-dumping  - which he included in case the
government  decided  not to accept his recommendation  against  including  national  interest
provisions  at all. In the event, the government  accepted  his overriding  recommendation
and the 1988  legislative  amendments  made no explicit  changes  to broaden  the criteria  for
taking  anti-dumping  action.
What the government did do was create the Anti-dumping Authority, as described
previously,  which  it saw as bringing  'a broader  perspective  to the determination  of such
issues as material injury and causal link'. However, there are no guidelines  for such a
broader  perspective  in the Anti-dumping  Authority  Act, and in practice  the ADA confines
its perspective  to the same legislative  criteria  that guide the determinations  of Customs.
Within those constraints  the ADA's  judgments  have on occasion  differed  from those of
Customs,  but not as a result  of considering  economy-wide  effects.
Nevertheless, there is  nothing in  the Act  which would prevent  the ADA from
recommending  to the Minister  that anti-dumping  action  not be taken,  even where  there  are
positive findings of dulaping, injury and causation. However, according to ADA
officials, this is only likely to arise in an 'extreme' situation and no cases have yet
occurred.22
Systemic  considerations:  'fairness'
No lesser  economist  than  Jagdish  Bhagwati has given his  support to  anti-dumping
procedures on the following grounds:
An economist  is right to claim that, if foreign  governments  subsidize  their exports,  this is
simply  marvellous for his own country,  which then gets cheaper goods and thus should
unilaterally  maintain  a policy  of free  trade.  He must,  how-ver,  recognize  that the acceptance
of this position  will fuel demands  for protection  and impcril  the possibility  of maintaining
the legitimacy,  and hence  the continuadon,  of free trade. A free  trade regime that does not
rein in or seek to regulate  artificial  subventions  will  likely help trigger  its own  demise.  An
analogy that I used to illustrate  this 'systemic'  implication  of the unilateralist  position in
conversing  with Milton Friedman on his celebrated  Free to Choose television  series is
perhaps  apt: Would  one be wise  to receive  stolen  property  simply  because  it is cheaper,  or
would  one rather  vote to prohibit  such transactions  because  of their  systemic  consequences?
This line of thought  supports  the cosmopolitan  economist's  position  that the world trading
ordcr ought to reflect  the essence  of the principle  of free trade for all  - for example,  by
permitting  the appropriate  use of countervailing  duties  and anti-dwnping  actions  to maintain
fair,  competitive  trade.  (Bhagwati  1988,  p.35,  emphasis  added)
This 'systemic' rationale stems from the notion of an international economic order in
which countries' actions are interdependent in their effects on economic welfare. Thus if
there is a widespread view that certain trade actions are unfair, even if they are beneficial
to the community as a whole, then failure to reflect that view in the rules of the game may
erode support for the game itself.
It is reasonable  to question, however, whether Bhagwati is right to lump both anti-
dumping and countervailing duties into the same 'system preserving' bag. The notion of
fairness is an amorphous thing, but government intervention to help a national exporter
compete against a foreign firm would seem to have more claim to being seen as unfair
than the case of a firm merely selling at lower cost in a foreign market than at home-
especially if, as we have argued, its actions are not based on predatory intent.
The  theft  analogy,  while  applicable  to  subsidisation,  also  seems  inappropriate  for
dumping. A more apt question might be: would one be wise to accept goods that are23
being given away...? It is not apparent that this question should also be answered in the
negative.
Box 2: Would 'dumping'  by any  other name  smell as  bad?
Language  can exert  a powerful  influence  on perceptions  about  what is right  or wrong  and what
needs to be done. In some cases the words we use can constrain a d0ate  to the point of
virtually  preempting  the conclusion.
For example,  trade policy discussion  in recent years has made liberal use of analogies  with
military conflict. If trade is war, then it is only natural to defend one's country from the
'invader'. It was not by accident that Henry Ford III, in pushing for protection for the
automobile industry in the early 1980s,  chose to describe competition from Japan as 'an
economic  Pearl Harbor.
So too for dumping.  Imports  that have been 'dumped'  are undesirable  by definition:  implying
something  that is not only 'unfair'  but offensive.  It would  take a fearless  or foolish  person (or
an economist)  to stand up and say that 'dumped  imports  are good for us' - especially  when
they cause 'injury' to a local industry. But to say that 'imports priced at less than what
foreigners  have  to pay are  good for us' sounds  fine. Yet the  two statements  are  equivalent.
Conclusion:  As long as low priced  exports  are called  dumping  they  will be popularly  regarded
as unfair,  their perpetrators  deserving  of every bit of punislhment  that the importing  country
meters  out.
Fairness 'down under'
In the Gruen Review some attention was given to the question of fairness which is said to
underpin Australia's  anti-dumping laws. One of Australia's largest retail outlets  - a
major importer - expressed 'complete agreement with the [anti-dumping] principles
espoused  by the GATT  ...' And the research  bureau of the Department  of Industry,
Technology and Commerce has argued that 'notions of fairness in the setting of export
prices are deeply entrenched in the Australian community' (Gruen 1986, p.24).24
Gruen  observed  that:
In  the  domestic  context  both  predatory  pricing  and  price  discrimination  are  banned  under  the
Trade  Practices  Act 1974  (Sections  46 and  49).  There  would  seem  some  logic  in applying
the same  type  of rules  to foreign  suppliers.  (Gruen,1986,  p.25)
Nevertheless the 'fairness' justification for Australia's anti-dumping legislation as it
stands  is not as cut and dried as it may seem. For one thing, as already noted, the rules
are not directed  at predatory  pricing  as such.  And domestic  rules on price discrimination
are not as readily translated  into anti-dumping  law as Gruen suggests. In the domestic
environment,  the obvious inequity is between national consumers who pay different
amounts  for the same  product.  As Dale (1980,  p.35) has said, it may be argued  that 'the
ideal of equality of opportunity  lies at the root of anti-price  discrimination  laws in the
domestic  market'.  But dumping  does  not breach  this ideal in the domestic  market.
Moreover,  since the early 1980s Australia's anti-dumping  procedures have also been
targeted  at more than the simple  price discrimination  to which national trade practices
legislation takes exception.  As Gruen observes: 'Selling goods at prices which do not
recover full costs ... is not regarded  as an unfair  trading  practice  internally.  It should  not
be treated  as unfair  in international  trade' (p.38).
In practice,  the government  appears  to see no moral  difficulty  in Australian  firms selling
overseas  at lower  prices  than  at home.  A booklet  titled  Exports  Can  Be Highly  Profitable,
Realistic  Costing  Shows How, prepared  by the Department  of Trade and Resources  as a
guide  for exporters,  contains  the following  advice:
... The  principle  of charging  only  the additional  costs  against  additional  sales  is known  as
'differential  costing',  and  this  is the  realistic  approach  in costing  exports.  (DTR  1980)
As the IAC  notes in its submission  to Gruen,  similar  advice  for exporters  has been given
by the Department  of Industry,  Technology and Commerce. It is not known to what
extent  Australian  exporters  have heeded (or needed)  this advice, but it is likely to be as
common  a business  practice  in this country  as it is elsewhere.25
Thus the question arises as to whether  there may be some  double standards  about what
constitutes  'fairness'  in export pricing  - depending  on whether  or not it is a competing
domestic industry  that suffers  'injury'.
'Dumping'  as normal market behaviour
In many cases,  as Viner  observed  back  in 1923,  the appearance  of dumping  or differential
pricing  will simply  reflect a more  competitive  export market  than domestic  market  in the
exporter's  country.  For example,  whenever  an exporter  is able to benefit  from protection
in his home market  which  he does not (cannot)  receive  internationally,  his export  price  -
if he is capable  of exporting  profitably  - must be below  the domestic  price.
Given the relatively  high prices which  tariff protection  provides  for much of Australian
manufacturing  industry  in domestic  markets,  Australia's  own  manufactured  exports  might
be expected  to be typically  in this situation.  A related  case has been documented  by the
IAC in its report into assistance  to the rice industry  (IAC 1986).  It found that domestic
prices for rice ranged from 32 to 116 per cent greater than the industry's  export prices
over the period 1980-86,  largely as a result of statutory  marketing  arrangements  in the
domestic  market.
In such cases, exporters need not be following any predatory or other strategically
discriminatory  practices;  all they need do is be responding  to the realities of the export
market  to be caught  for dumping.  It seems  unfair  that  this should  be labelled  unfair.
It is commonly  argued,  however,  that a firm's  low  export  prices in this situation  are being
cross-subsidised by the higher prices which protection or regulation permits in the
domestic  market.  This raises some  complex  theoretical  issues  which  it is not necessary  to
explore  here. (See for example  Dale, 1980,  pp. 35-7.) The upshot  of that analysis  is that
the conditions  for such  cross-subsidisation  to be either a feasible  or rational  strategy  are
similarly  stringent  to those  for predation.  A point that is often missed  is that an exporting
firm will only derive surplus  profits ('economic  rent') from protection  at home if it has
monopoly privileges. It *; in any case doubtful that concern about possible cross-
subsidisation  is an important  factor  in the Australian  anti-dumping  process,  given  that the
anti-dumping  laws in practice  require  no examination  of it.26
The anti-dumping  compact
While it is questionable whether the Australian community generally regards export
pricing at below normal value as unfair, there is little doubt that import-competing
industries  in Australia are strongly  of that belief. And, coming back to the Bhagwati
point,  the government  clearly  believes  that  in the absence  of an acceptable  anti-dumping
mechanism, the liberalisation of (other) barriers to imports in Australia would be
politically  much  more  difficult  to achieve.  As Gruen  has put it:
There  is a fragile  consensus  in place  favouring  lower  long  term  levels  of assistance  and  a
rationalised  outward  looking  industry  structure.  Any suggestion that the Government  is
resiling from  its  strongly  expressed  commitment to  an  effective  speedy anti-
dumpinglcountervailing  system could put at risk the acceptance by manufacturers  and
unions  of the  process of restructuring.  (p.25, emphasis  added)
Indeed, there could be said to be an implicit  compact between  government  and industry
about  the protection/anti-dumping  tradeoff.  In the case  of the chemicals  industry  - which
accounted  for 90 per cent of all dumping duties collected  in 1986-87  - this link was
recently made explicit. The IAC has observed that the release of the govemment's
decision  on the Gruen  Report  coincided  with the decision  to reduce  tariff  levels for these
industries.
Senator  Button ... noted the concem which the industries had expressed about the
recommendation  of Professor  Gruen's  report  on anti-dumping  measures.  The  Minister  said
he considered  the combination  of the decisions on the IAC's  report  on Chemicals  and
Plastics  and  on  Professor  Gruen's  report  would lead to a sound  competitive  future  for these
industries.  (Ministerial  Statement,  cited  in  IAC  (1987),  emphasis  added)
This suggests  that Australia's  anti-dumping  process has as much to do with perceptions
of political feasibility as with broader and more high minded issues of 'fairness'. A
question  that might  reasonably  be asked  is whether  industry's  acceptance  of reductions  in
tariffs  reflects its perception  that  the anti-dumping  process  is a substitute  for other  forms
of protection. That would explain industry's active lobbying against the key Gruen
recommendations.  Those recommendations  were, after all, designed to 'discourage  too27
extensive use of the anti-dumping  system as a more readily available trade regulation
system  ...'  (p.48).
If the real raison  d'tre  of the anti-dumping  system  is a strategic  one,  it is also reasonable
to question  whether  it may not  end up endangering  the broader  liberalisation  objective  that
it is meant to serve. Apart from possibly encouraging a diversion of protectionist
pressures  from more open and accountable  forums  like the IAC, there is the danger  that
this sort of 'reputable' protection could be expanded into a comprehensive  system of
provisions against any trade detmed to be 'unfair', as illustrated by Section 301 and
Super  301 provisions  of recent  United  States  trade  legislation.  Once  justified  in that  way,
trade barriers become even more difficult to remove or reform than those justified in
straightforward  protectionist  terms.28
IV. ANTI-DUMPING  IN PRACTICE
Putting to one side the more fundamental issues about the role of an anti-dumping
system,  there is increasing  concem  intemationally  that anti-dumping  is not being  used in
the spirit  of the GAIT rules - that it is operating  in practice  as a defacto  protectionist
device, rather than solely as a means of preventing  injury from imports priced below
levels in the country  of origin. (Hindley,  1988;  Bhagwati,  1988)
The fact that Australia - along with Canada, the EC and the United States - has been a
much  greater  user  of anti-dumping  action  than  other  comparable  countries,  has sometimes
been interpreted as indicating  that anti-dumping  processes  in Australia (and the other
countries)  are biased  in favour  of such action.  This is the issue with which  this chapter is
largely concerned.  It is approached  from two (overlapping)  perspectives:  (a) trends in
anti-dumping  activity  in Australia,  and (b) how  the rules and procedures  operate.
The  pattern  and extent  of anti-dumping
There is no denying that Australia  has been one of the key players  in the anti-dumping
'game'.  Between  1980-81  and 1988-89  Australia  took 218 actions,  almost  as many  as the
United  States and  considerably  more than Canada  and (possibly)  the EC  - all countries
with much  larger import  volumes  than Australia  (table  2). At its peak in 1984,  Australia's
outstanding  anti-dumping  actions  were equal to one-third  of the total actions  outstanding
as declared  by members  of the  GAIT Anti-dumping  Code.
However,  as is also apparent  from the table and from figure 1, if relative anti-dumping
activity is in itself taken as an indicator of the possible misuse of a country's anti-
dumping  procedures,  then Australia's  record looks a lot better in 1988-89  than it did five
years before.29
Table 2: International  comparisons  of anti-dumping  actionsa
Year ended 30 June  Australia  USA  Canada  ECb
1981  23  5  15  13
1982  26  48  8  22
1983  57  10  37  33
1984  41  33  13  23
1985  18  28  17  22
1986  27  25  27  18
1987  4  40  10  18
1988  7  22  23  9
1989  15  29  5  19
Total  218  240  155  177
* Duties  and price undertakings  under anti-dwmping  procedures.
b  Excludes  anti-dumping  actions taken against non-members  of the Code and by individual  EC countries  on a
bilateral basis.
Sourcer  Australian  Customs  Service;  GATT.
Figure 3: Australia's  'stock'  of anti-dumping  compared





Source:  GAiT.  Committee  on Anti-Dumping  Practices.  Reports  for 1984 and  1989.30
Rise  and fall
In fact, as shown  in figure  4, Australia  has less anti-dumping  actions  on the books  today
than at any time in the past decade. The rise in the 'stock' of anti-dumping  up to 1985
reflected  an increase  in the number  of actions in the early 1980s,  discussed  previously,
combined with only a very low rate of revocation  of previous  anti-dumping  measures.
After 1985, the situation was reversed: the fall in the stock of anti-dumping actions
reflected  a sudden  increase  in the revocation  of old measures,  combined  with a decline  in
the number  of new cases.  (See also table 3.)
The most straightforward  explanation  for the rise in anti-dumping  activity in the early
1980s is that there was simply a sudden increase in dumping at that time. Gruen has
observed  that 'with  the world economic  recession  in the early 1980s,  basic commodities
became  available  at bargain  basement  prices'  (p.8).  At such  times,  as indicated  earlier,  it
is normal business  practice  to cut prices and reduce  profit margins, as long as marginal
variable costs are covered. This would normally apply to both domestic and foreign
markets  and need not lead  to dumping  in the traditional  'price disc-iniination'  sense.
Figure  4: The  rise and  fall of anti-dumping
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Table 3: Anti-dumping  stocks and  flows
Year ended  New  actions  Old  actions  Outstanding  actions
30  June  taken  revoked  at  30 June
1979  25  0  29
1980  28  1  56
1981  23  1  78
1982  26  0  104
1983  57  2  157
1984  41  17  183
1985  18  13  188
1986  27  50  165
1987  4  60  109
1988  7  66  50
1989  15  43  22
Source. Australian  Customs  Service
Coincidentally,  however,  it was  just prior to this time that Customs  began  to interpret  the
GAIT  provision that the 'normal value' for an export good should be taken as the
comparable domestic price 'in the ordinary course of trade' to mean not at a loss.
Redefined  in this way, it would not be unusual  for the incidence of 'dumping' to rise
during a global  recession.  And, with domestic  markets  depressed,  'injury'  is more  likely
to be found.
The increased  demand  for anti-dumping  action  in Australia  can similarly  be explained  not
only as a reaction to the possible  increase  in dumping  (as originally  defined) but also by
the competitive  pressures  placed on Australian  industries  in an economic  enviromnent
characterised  by declining  intemational  competitiveness  in depressed  domestic  markets.
As shown  in figure 5, the rise and  faUl  of anti-dumping  cases was broadly  correlated  with
movements  in the international  competitiveness  of Australian  manufacturing  industry.  In
general the second half of the 1980s has also been characterised  by a more buoyant
domestic  economy  than  the early 1980s.
Similarly,  the sudden  increase  in the revocation  of anti-dumping  measures  which  began  in
the mid-  1980s  - well before the introduction  of the three  year sunset  clause - may be
attributable  to the sharp depreciation  of the Australian  dollar,  which  greatly  improved  the
intemational  competitiveness  of Australian  manufacturers,  combined  with a more  active
review process by Customs to weed out anti-dumping  which was no longer justified.32
This in turn may  well  have  been  prompted  by the new  scrutiny  to which  the anti-dumping
process  was being  subjected  around  the time of the Gruen  Review.
Figure 5: Competitiveness and  the  demand  for anti-dumping
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Source:  Treasury  Budget Statements  1989-90  and Australian  Customs  Service.
The translation  of domestic  competitive  difficulties  into anti-dumping  action  rather than
demand for conventional  assistance  could have reflected perceptions  that the need to
pursue  such assistance  through  the IAC  process  would  be too difficult  for most industries
-except  the politically  most  powerful  ones, like textiles  and clothing  and motor  vehicle
producers.  Gruen  makes the following  telling observation  about the anti-dumping  surge
in the  early 1980s:
Increasing  import  competition  and  the  Government's  clear  policy  of avoiding  raising  taiiff
levels  or  taking  more  drastic  protectionist  measures  placed  the  dumping  administration  under
pressure  in the 1980s.  Phrases  such  as 'the first  line  of defence'  came  to be applied  to the
system.  (p.8)33
Acceptance  rate for anti-dumping  petitions
One possible  indicator  of how tight or loose the Australian  procedures  have been is the
proportion  of anti-dumping  petitions  which actually  get through.  Ideally  we would  want
to know  the proportion  of applications  received  (the very beginning  of the process,  as set
out above in figure 2) that result in duties  or undertakings.  Data are not available  for the
number  of petitions  which  do not  make it to the formal  initiation  stage,  although  one anti-
dumping official's informed guesstimate  is that the proportion of 'non-starters'  would
have been  around  one-third  in recent  years.
In the absence of data on applications  received, we must use the statistics on cases
formally  initiated  as an indicator  of the 'demand'  for anti-dumping  action.  The proportion
of cases  formally  initiated  which  has resulted  in such action is shown  in figure 6. In the
1970s it averaged 32 per cent, but rose to 46 per cent in the 1980s. The overall rise
mainly reflected  a sharp increase  in the early 1980s,  at the same time as the increase  in
cases (in other  words,  as the number  of cases  increased  so too did the proportion  of them
with a positive outcome).  This could be seen as supply  responding  to demand. On the
other hand, it may simply  reflect the rise in actual  dumping  through  this period , so that
there were more well founded petitions than before. However, as already noted, the
dumping ground  rules changed  in the early 1980s,  making  it easier to obtain (supply)  a
positive  finding  of dumping.
Figure 6 also shows  a sharp  rise in the acceptance  rate in 1988-89,  the year in which  the
current system began (in September  1988).  In practice,  much  of this comprises  actions
carried  over under  the previous  system  and, according  to anti-dumping  officials,  reflects
greater stringency  in the screening  process  before formal  initiation of cases. Of the 19
cases actually initiated in 1988-89,  however,  only 5 (26 per cent) have led to positive
anti-dumping  action,  the rest being  terminated34
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Source.  Austalian Customs  Service  and GAIT
Duration  of anti-dumping  action
Returning  to a theme in the previous  chapter,  one test of the protectionist  effect  of anti-
dumping  procedures  is the length  of time that anti-dumping  actions  remain  in force.  Long
term 'dumping'  is not an economic  threat,  nor can it be motivated  by the sort  of strategic
considerations  which  people  might regard as unfair. In addition,  the longer the duration
of anti-dumping action, the greater the possibility that it may cease to be justified
according  to anti-dumping  criteria.
Table 1 above suggests  that on this basis the Australian  scheme  has not performed  very
well, al least up until the tidying  up that began in 1985.  It is of some interest  that of the
245 cases that were revoked or released between 1985 and 1989, only 11 (or 4.5 per
cent) have been the subject of renewed investigations.  That has been explained as a
consequence of the continuing low value of the Australian dollar. Although the35
depreciation  of the dollar should  have made no difference  to findings  of dumping,  it is
likely  to have  made  injury  more  difficult  to prove.
Country coverage  and incidence
As a general  proposition  it would  seem  that, for any given  commodity,  the more  countries
against which  anti-dumping  action  is taken,  the more of a 'protectionist'  role played  '
the anti-dumping  process  - in the sense  of protecting  an industry  from,  and  depriving  an
economy  of, prevailing  world  market  prices.
Between  July 1983  and June 1989,  there were some  270 dumping  measures  revoked  or
released,  comprising  about 115  commodities.  For 50 per cent of these  commodities,  anti-
dumping  actions  involved  a single  supplier,  10  per cent of commodities  had two  dumping
suppliers;  and 40 per cent had three or more suppliers  subject  to anti-dumping  penalties.
For nearly 20 per cent of commodities  involved,  actions had been taken against  six or
more  suppliers.
That the anti-dumping  net is in practice  catching  much normal  international  trade is also
illustrated  by the mixed  catch  of countries  in particular  cases  - from the least developed,
to centrally  planned  and highly  industrialised.  For example,  consider  the following  lineup
of countries against which anti-dumping  duties were imposed on imports of electric
motors: India, Brazil, Taiwan, China, Czechoslovakia,  Romania,  Yugoslavia,  Poland,
East Germany,  West Germany, the Netherlands  and the United Kingdom  - and this
action lasted for over eight years. (Other examples can be found in table 6 below on
dumping  margins.)
While  all of these  suppliers  were undoubtedly  found  to have  been  'dumping'  according  to
Australia's  legislation  - and  consistent  with  GATT  rules  - it is reasonable  to conclude
that ill such cases the dumped prices were in fact 'the world price'. Such cases seem
highly  unlikely  to be of an intermittent  or temporary  nature,  and  predation  is clearly  out  of
the question.
The incidence  of Australia's  anti-dumping  action  varies considerably  by country group
(table 4). Relative to their shares  in Australia's  impoits, the hardest hit regions are the36
'Asian  Tigers'  (mainly  Korea and  Taiwan)  and, especially,  China  and the Eastern  bloc -
the last accounting  for 9 per cent of anti-dumping  but only 0.2 per cent of imports.  China
and the Tigers are also the world's lowest cost suppliers of many light manufactures.
However, another top competitor, Japan, had the lowest incidence of anti-dumping
relative  to its import  share.
The relatively  very high incidence  of anti-dumping  actions  involving  centrally  planned
economies  undoubtedly  reflects the fact that, for these  countries,  domestic  selling  prices
are not used to determine  normal values. Instead, normal values are based on export
prices from market economies,  the choice of which will obviously be critical to the
dumping  assessment.  It is difficult  to imagine  how such a decision  could  be made on any
objective grounds and, even if it could, there remains the problem that whenever the
centrally  planned  economy  is the lowest  cost producer,  its export  price  must inevitably  be
found to be below  the (third  country)  'normal  value'.  This is clearly  relevant  to China, for
example, and that country  has been  justifiably  critical of its treatment  under Australia's
anti-dumping  laws.
Table 4: Country incidence of Australian anti-dumping
Proportion  of  Share of
anti-dnmping  actionsa  importsb
North  America  12  24.3
NewZealand  5  4.1
Westen  Europe  34  26.4
Japan  10  23.1
Asian Tigersc  16  8.0
China  6  1.2
Other developing  7  12.3
Eastem bloc  9  0.2
a Based on 249 actions  revoked  or released  between  July 1983  and June 1989.
b  In 1985.
C Hc...g  Kong.  Korea,  Singapore  and Taiwan.
Sources:  Australian  Customs  Service  and IMF,  Direction  of Trade.37
Industry incidence
The pattern  of anti-dumping  cases  (fonnally  initiated)  across  industries  is quite uneven,  as
shown in table 5. If industries simply saw anti-dumping as an alternative form of
assistance, then it could be expected that the industries with the greatest need for
assistance  would be the predominant  claimants.  While the table reveals no clear pattern
overall, it is apparent that the least competitive  sectors such as textiles, clothing and
footwear  and passenger  motor vehicles  are, in fact, the lowest users of the anti-dumping
process.  That may  reflect the fact that these  industries  were already  receiving  very high
protection  and largely  through  import  quotas,  which  serve  to insulate  domestic  industries
from import-price  competition.  (The only items of clothing that have been subject to
dumping  duties  are those  for which  quotas  do not apply.)
The predominant  users of anti-dumping  action have been the chemicals  industries  and
producers  of 'other  machinery  and equipment'.  The former  is a major input  into industrial
processes  (recalling  the fertiliser  case) and has received  relatively  low assistance  through
the IAC  process.
Price effects of anti-dumping action
The overall price effects of anti-dumping action are very difficult to evaluate from
available  information.  Unlike  the tariff, actual  duties collected  are next to useless  as an
indicator of the average 'wedge' between foreign and domestic prices. That is partly
because  a significant  proportion  of anti-dumping  actions  (50 per cent  in 1988-89)  take  the
form of price undertakings,  which  are not reflected  in customs  revenue.  Moreover,  anti-
dumping  duties  themselves  operate  on a sliding  scale,  depending  on the gap between  the
import price and a designated  'floor price' and, as described  later,  it is in the exporters'
interests to price up to the floor level and appropriate  the revenue that would  otherwise
have been  paid  in duties.Table  5: Incidence  of  anti-dumping  cases  by  industrya
Assistance  rateC
Industry  83 -84 b  84-85  85-86  86-87  87-88  88-89  6  year  total  Share  of  total  Nominal  Effective
no.  no.  no.  no.  no.  no.  no.  %  %  %
Foodandbeverges  4  3  3  1  - 2  13  4.6  8  5
Textiles  1  - 2  1  - 1  5  1.8  24  71
Clothing and footwear  I  1  - - - - 2  0.7  70  182  w
Wood, wood products and furniture  I  - - - - - I  OA  13  17
Paps  adpapn  products  3  2  - - - 5  10  3.5  12  15
Chemical and petroleum products  24  21  21  12  9  4  91  32.3  4  13
Non-metallicmineralproducts  I  - - - 2  - 3  1.1  3  4
Basicmetalproducts  9  9  8  3  8  - 37  13.1  6  9
Fabricatedmetalprducts  6  3  1  4  - - 14  5.0  15  22
Transport eqwpment  - - 2  - - - 2  0.7  27  51
Other machinery and equipment  17  26  7  17  6  8  81  28.7  16  22
Miscellaneous  manufactuing  4  3  10  2  4  0  23  8.1  18  26
Total  71  68  54  40  29  20  282  100.0
a Cases formaUy  initiated.
b Extrapolated  from data including  subsidy  countervailing  cases
c The nominal  rate of assistance  is based  on tariffs and other assistance  for each industrys output,  whereas  the effective rate is a measure of net assistance,  taking into account
tariffs and assistance  on inputs as well.
Source: Australian  Customs  Service.39
Statistics  on dumping  margins  are not  kept systematically,  but are indicated  in the reports
on particular  cases  and in reports to the GATT.  Lloyd (1977)  had access to statistics  for
the early 1970s,  which showed  that average  margins  across  industries  ranged  from 10 to
43 per  cent, and were in most  cases  significantly  greater  than  the relevant  average  nominal
rates of assistance.
Table 6 shows  the dumping  margins  for cases  on which  action was taken in 1984-85  and
1988-89. As in the early 1970s, the dumping margins vary considerably from one
product  to another,  and also for the different  suppliers  of a given  product.  (For  example,
margins on fluorescent lamps ranged from 3 per cent for Japan to 50 per cent for
Canada.) In most cases the dumping margins are considerably  larger than the actual
protective  tariff.  No significant  differences  are discernible  in the 1988-89  data,  compared
to that  of five years  earlier,  except  that the  average  dumping  margin  is if anything  higher.
Gruen  (1986)  notes  that at the end of 1985  (when  anti-dumping  action was near  its peak)
only two per cent of statistical  import keys and two per cent by value of imports  were
affected  (p. 5). While this suggests  that anti-dumping's  economy-wide  price effects  may
not be important,  such statistics  are deceptive.  The IAC  has argued  that the very existence
of anti-dumping procedures can lead to pre-emptive price increases, sometimes in
situations  where  anti-dumping  action  would  not have  occurred.  One witness  to an inquiry
stated  that
... overseas  suppliers  are  generally  not  prepared  to offer  their  best  export  price  to Australia
for fear  of ... being  charged  with  dunping.  (Cited  in  Cannichael,  1986,  p. 11)
To the extent that this system has such an intimidating  effect, the statistics  relating to
formal  anti-dumping  action  may  considerably  understate  its potential  effect  on domestic
price formation.40
Table 6: Dumping margins
Average
dumping
Product  Country  Margina  Tariffb
A.  PERIOD  1984-8S
Outboard motors  USA  27.1  P  10




South Africa  64.0  15
Alloy steel chain  Sweden  3.0  P  20
Fluorescent lamps  Taiwan  44.0  P  10
Thailand  28.0  P
Korea  15.0  P
Philippines  18.0  P
Hungary  15.0  P
Japan  3.0  P  15
West Germany  6.0  P
Canada  50.0  P
East Germany  10.0  P
Polystyrene  France  5.8  30
Canada  5.9
West Germany  5.3
Ceiling sweep fans  Hong Kong  32.0  20
Pasta  Italy  23.0  10
Phosphoric acid  Japan  25.0  20
Diagnostic reagent strips  West Germany  79.0  15
Pdmalic  anhydride  Brazil  50.0  P  20
Israel  6.0  P
Taiwan  11.0  P
Dextrose monohydrate  Italy  10.0  P  10
Singapore  10.0  P  5
PVC  Italy  7.0  P  25
Domestic microwave  Japan  12.0  P  25
Waxed cotton motorcycle garments  Korea  22.5  P  40+
Stearic acid  Malaysia  16.3  P  5
Di-oxtyl phtholate  Korea  26.8  P  15
Vinyl floor tiles  Norway  20.6  P  20
Film laminate  USA  10.0  P  22.5
B.  PERIOD  1988.89
Levamisole Hydrochloride  Switzerland  9.0  P  flee
Singapore  27.0  P
China  32.5  P
Hong Kong  36.5  P
Belgium  20.0  P




Product  Country  Margina  TariffP
Coloured  pencils  Brazil  43.0 P  8
Hungary  29.0 P  13
Poland  44.0 P
Multityred  rollers  Czechoslovakia  56.0 P  24
Fork  lift trucks  Japan  14.0 P  21
Cement  clinkers  Katea  55.0 P  fiee
Electric  motorparts  Taiwwa  32.5 P  13
Outboard  motors  Belgiun  39.0 P  10
Japal  25.5 P
USA  28.0 P
A dunping margin is the difference  between  the 'nomal value' and the fob export  price, expressed  as a percentage  of the
nomnal  value. P denotes provisional  finding.
b For each product,  the prefeential rate for developing  country  exporters  is 5 per centage  points below the general rate.
Source: Australian Customs Service, Semi-annual report of Anti-dumping actions,  prepared for GA1T, various issues.
Rules  and procedures
A necessary complement to looking at the outcomes of anti-dumping cases is an
understanding  of how the rules and procedures  work. It is here that the international
debate is mainly focused - there is concern to tighten up the rules and procedures to
prevent or limit the extent to which anti-dumping is used as a protectionist, instead of 'fair
trading',  device.
In Australia, as in other countries, the rules and procedures have changed considerably
over the past decade. Three aspects which are central to the anti-dumping system are the
criteria relating to 'normal value', 'material injury' and causality between the two. To
paraphrase the GATT requirement: 'products introduced into the commerce of another
country at less than normal value is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material
injury to an industry'. We look at those in turn.42
Normal value
GAlTs  Article VI states, in the rather difficult language for which the text of the General
Agreement is famous:
For the purposes  of this Article,  a product  is to be considered  as being introduced  into the
commerce  of an importing  country  at less than its normal  value, if the price of the product
exported  from  one country  to another
(a)  is less than the comparable  price, in the ordinary  course of trade, for the like product
when  destined  for consumption  in the exporting  country,  or,
(b)  in the absence  of such  domestic  price, is less than  either
(i)  the  highest  comparable  price  for the like  product  for export  to any third  country  in
the ordinary  course  of trade,  or
(ii)  the cost of production  of the product  in the country  of origin plus a reasonable
addition  for selling  cost and profit.
Due allowance  shall  be made  in each case  for differences  in conditions  and terms  of sale, for
differences  in taxation,  and for other  differences  affecting  price  comparability.
Even to the uninitiated  it should be apparent that this definition is full of linguistic
loopholes.  For example,  what exactly  does the 'ordinary  course  of trade',  the 'like
product',  the 'cost  of production'  and  the 'reasonable  addition'  refer  to? The Anti-
dumping Code is not very helpful.  (It tells us that the 'term "like product"  shall be
interpreted to mean a product which is identical, ie. alike in all respects to the product
under  consideration,  or  in  the absence  of  such  a product,  another  product  which,
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling  those of the
product  under  consideration'.)  It  is thus  in each  country's  national  legislation  and
administrative practice that we must seek an interpretation of such terms.
The Australian legislation (the 1975 Act) was similarly vague on the above aspects of
'normal value' to GATT Article VI and the Code. However, as already noted, the term
'ordinary course of trade' began to be administratively interpreted in the early 1980s as43
excluding sales at a level which  does not cover all costs (fixed and variable).  This was
given  legislative  backing  in the 1984  changes  to the Act which  essentially  put it that,  if the
selling  price  in the exporters  home  market  is
- for an 'extended period of time'
- and for a 'substantial quantity of goods'
- less than  what Customs  judges to be the relevnit costs  of production,
then, if 'it is likely'  that the seller won't be able to make up the difference  subsequently,
that price shall  not be taken to have  occurred  in the 'ordinary  course  of trade'.
These changes (shared by the other leading anti-dumping countries) opened up a
Pandora's Box of additional possibilities for finding dumping. They mean that the
essential  price  discriminatory  requirement  for dumping  need  no longer  apply.  And export
prices need  not be lower  than  domestic  selling  prices  for dumping  to be found.
It is difficult  to find any  justification  in economics  or equity  for this new rule. The ADA
has suggested  that if an exporter  is selling  domestically  at a loss for a lengthy  period then
he 'is up to something  funny; he is not behaving  as does an ordinary business'  (ADA,
1984, p. 23). But it would not be out of the ordinary for a manufacturer not to be
covering  all of hisfLxed  costs (depreciation  on plant  and equipment).  In depressed  market
conditions  this might indeed  be the rational  profit maximising  strategy,  at least up to the
point  when assets needed  to be replaced.  Pricing  all sales below  variable  costs, however,
would be unusual (irrational)  and it is hard to think of any plausible circumstances  in
which  such a strategy  would be pursued  (especially  given the unlikelihood  of achieving
long term predatory  gains).  In any case, as noted  earlier,  the longer the period involved,
the larger  are the likely  net benefits  to the importing  country  from  low  prices.
Given the lack of basis for introducing this Section 5(9) rule, it is unfortunate that
Customs  have interpreted  it to mean that  local selling  prices  can be used  as normal  values
only if it is proven that  they  are not below  cost. Most  firms  keep  production  and  financial
records  for their internal  planning  and domestic  tax purposes,  not for the convenience  of
other countries' anti-dumping  administrators.  It is inevitable,  therefore,  that such proof
will often be lacking  - even where  reasonable  grounds  exist  for accepting  that  sales have44
not been made at a loss. And this is what has in fact happened. (In a recent report, the
ADA has interpreted  the proof requirement  in the Act in the opposite way to the ACS;
namely,  that local selling  prices are to be used unless  there is proof that they are below
cost.)
The legislation  provides  a hierarchy  of techniques  for deterrining normal  values in the
absence of a usable domestic selling price. They are shown in descending order of
priority in table 7. What this reveals is that in only 42 per cent of cases in the period
1980-85  were local selling  prices directly  used, while  23 per cent of normal  values  were
'constructed'  or based on third country  producers'  prices, and 36 per cent were based on
'available  and relevant  information'.  Discussions  with anti-dumping  officials  reveal that
in practice  the 'available  and relevant  information'  that has typically  been  used  is the local
selling  price anyway  - an indirect  procedure  necessitated  by the proof  requirement.
Table 7: Methods used  to  determine  normal  value, 198045
Number
Reason for not  using method  of  times
Method  (1)  used
(1)  Domestic  price  in country  of export  73
(2)  Constructed  from  exporters  cost  information  No  domestic  sales  14
Domestic  sales  at a loss  15
(3)  Assessed  from  third  country  information  Non-market  domestic  pricing  11
(4)  Assessed  using  'available  relevant  and  reliable  Insufficient  information  to use  63
information'  methods  (1)  or  (2)
Total  176
Source:  Based  on Gruen  (1986).  Table  3. p. 27.
Information  is unavailable  on the proportion  of positive  dumping findings  derived  from
each method. There is the suspicion,  however, that techniques  other than local selling
price are more  likely to yield normal  values above export prices. Gruen's  view was that
'it is desirable to reduce the number of "constructed normal values" to the irreducible
minimum' (p.29). He noted that 'there are technical problems in constructing prices (cost
allocation,  most  economic producer or average  producer, depreciation  policy, etc.),
which give considerable variation in possible results' (p.28).45
As indicated previously, the imputed profit issue has been a central concern since the
Gruen Review. Gruen had argued that if his recommendation to repeal S5(9) on sales at a
loss was not accepted, 'some minor move towards a more realistic normal value could be
obtained  by  not including  a  "reasonable  profit"  in  constructed  prices'  (p.29).  The
government appeared to accept this approach, but the ADA recommended, on grounds
consistent with the logic of the Act, that this should only apply to S5(9); constructed
values in other circumstances (such as when there are no domestic sales) should include
an imputed profit. This interpretation was accepted.
Box 3: The cherries-in-brine  case
The Austrlan  experience  has been  that it is possible  for quite different findings  to be made
about anti-dumping  matters  on the basis  of the same  'facts'.  This is illustrated  by the case  of
'cherries  in brine  or other  preservative,  from  Italy'.
This case was sent  .o the IAC  for review  in Mareh 1985,  following  a request  by a producer  of
glace cherries  that the Minister  revoke  anti-dumping  duties  that had recently  been applied to
imports  of cherries  in brine.  The Chairman  of the IAC  has described  some  points at issue:
While the Act requires that like goods be compared with like, this is easier said than done.
Even  for this product  - which  may  appear to present  little difficulty  in comparing  Australian  imports
with like goods in the exporting country - four different grades of cherries are commercially
recognised  in Italy, the country about which the dumping  complaint  was made. Customs'  judgment
was to recognise  only three grades.  In its subsequent  review,  the Commission  found that  if four grades
had  been used  the extent  of dumping  found  would  have  been  much less.
This was true also of the valuation  of reusable  drums in which cherries are packaged. Customs
considered  that the drums  should be valued  as new whilst  Commission  investigations  suggested  that,
in view of their physical  condition,  the drums  were only worth  half that  much.
The exercise  of different  judgments in this case can be seen to have produced  widely divergent
results in terms of the penalty which  could be imposed  on the users  of brined cherries (Carmichael,
1986,  pp. 2-3).46
Material injury
The central issues here have been described by the IAC as follows.
Anti-dumping  cases always  start with a local firm  or industry  complaining  that imports  are
causing  injury.  Typically,  evidence  is produced  of some decline  in, say, prfitability, sales
or employment.  However,  considerable  judgment is required to determine  in a practical
sense  what injury  means.  Does  the  loss of one sale constitute  injury?  Does,  say, a 5 per cent
loss in sales carry  more  weight  in determining  whether  injury  is occurring  than a 5 per cent
drop in prices or employment?  Even where injury is judged to exist, it is common for
investigations to  find that injury is attributable to a range of factors - changing
technologies,  consumer  tastes and general  economic  conditions  - and dumping  may, or
may not, be numbered  amongst  these. And  even where  dumping  is involved  in such cases,
it is often  not possible  to determine  what share  of total injury  is attributable  to it alone.
Before  anti-dumping  action is taken it is necessary  to establish  that there is injury  and that
there  is a causal  link  between  dumping  and material  injury.  In the Commission's  experience,
unraveUling  an often confusing web of cause and effect is a precarious task. When the
exercise  is conducted  in an administrative  framewoik  which  places most emphasis  on the
situation of a domestic producer,  there must be a tendency for outcomes  to favour these
producers  - even where factors  other  than dumping  may be contributing  substantially  to
their  problems.  (Carmichael,  1986,  pp.5-6)
The GATT Anti-dumping  Code,  which  as already  noted was motivated  mainly  by
concern to reduce alleged US protectionist use of anti-dumping, stiffened the language on
injury by requiring that dumped imports were required  to be the 'principal' cause of
injury. In the Tokyo Round revisions of 1979 this was deleted, so that the GATT injury
test remains today that dumped goods 'cause' 'material injury'.
This, of course, begs the question of what constitutes injury and what is 'material'. These
questions have also received considerable attention in Australia since the Gruen Review.
Like the GATT Code, the Australian legislation provides a 'non-exhaustive' list of factors
to be  taken  into  account  in  determining  injury  - including  loss  of market  share,
employment  or  production  declines,  price  'suppression',  profit  declines  and  under-
utilisation of capacity. In practice, the experience through the early 1980s had been that47
most industries  fairly readily  passed the injury test. The Administration  appears  to have
been  more concerned  with establishing  that an industry  had been injured,  by reference  to
one or more  of the criteria  just listed,  than  the question  of whether  the imports  in question
had caused  that injury.  As one researcher  has observed,  on the basis  of an examination  of
anti-dumping  reports  through  the early 1980s:
The Department's  view  seems  to be that  if dumping  is occuning  and  there  is evidence  of
injury  then  there  is a case  for  the imposition  of dumping  duties.  This  seems  to be the case
even  when  injury  is not  appreciable  or when  there  are  other  factors  significant  to the  local
industry's  plight.  (McGinnis  1985,  p.38)
And Gruen noted in his report that he had been 'provided  with a substantial  number  of
examples  where  Australia  has applied  anti-dumping  actions  which, on the face of it, did
not produce "material  injury" (or threatened  injury) or where there was no causal link
between injury  and imports'  (p.31).
An approach  used in Australia (and other countries)  has beei. to 'cumulate'  the market
effects  of dumped  imports  from different  sources  where  imports  from a single  source are
too small to  have much effect on their own. For  example, the  Singapore High
Commission in  Australia drew  Gruen's attention 'to  three cases in  1980 when
Singapce's share  of the Australian  market was 0.01% (vertical filing cabinets), 0.05%
(synthetic  organic  dyes), 0.26%  (correcting  fluid)' (p.31).
(Digressing for a moment, it seems curious that Singapore, a virtually free trading
country, should  have been found guilty of dumping  in the first place. Arbitrage  - the
moving  about  of goods  and services  to benefit  from price differentials  - would  normally
ensure dhat  there was little scope  in a free trade country  for selling  on world markets  at
lower  prices than  at home.)
There was an active debate in the GAIT a few vears ago about whether  the practice of
cumulation  was consistent  with the Code. Like many interpretative  debates about the
intent of (intentionally) ambiguous GATT 'law' it appears to have led nowhere.
However,  there is no doubt  that such  an approach  is on firm  legal ground  in Australia,  as48
it has been tested in the Federal Court. (Although that need not make it any more rational
from an economist's perspective.)
Gruen recommended three changes to the tests for injury 'to place emphasis on the need
for material injury and a causal link':
*  price suppression must be backed up by other factors such as 'seriously reduced
profits'
*  a 'substantial effort should be made to allow for the influence of factors other than
dumping in causing injury'
*  injury should be significant, not just for the specific product, but 'in the context of
the entire operations of the relevant establishment'.
The government  appeared to accept the broad thrust  of these recommendations  and
allocated injury/causal link questions as an important function of the new Anti-dumping
Authority. In the Second Reading Speech for the 1988 ADA Bill, the Minister remarked:
Assessments  of material injury and the causal link must be vigorous and anti-dumping
measures  should  not be used as a de facto  fonm  of protection:  they have to be seen as a set
of measures  to discourage  unacceptable  short-term  trends to knock out an industry ... The
Authority  will  take into  account  the  influence  of factors  other  than  dumping  in causing  injury
.. (Jones 1988, p.2311)
In  a reference  to the ADA  shortly  after  its  formation,  the  government  sought the
Authority's advice on what regulations  -formal ministerial directions might be issued
to put into effect  the Govemrnent's  intention  that ... in determining  material  injury  ...
(a)  the reduction  of prices  caused  by dumping  should  substantially  reduce  ... profits  on the
Australian  production  ... and
(b)  the market share  of dumped  imports  should  not be insubstantial  ...
As indicated earlier, industry bodies objected strenuously to this dual test for injury and
also to the Minister's statement that industry needs to be threatened with being 'knocked
out' before anti-dumping measures are applied (Stubbs 1989).49
The ADA's report, while providing a masterly exposition of the issues, was in the end
unable to tie the concept of 'material injury' down much better in operational terms than
previously.
The Authority  concludes  that 'material'  should  be considered  in terms  of its opposite:  thus
not immaterial,  insubstantial  or insignificant;  greater  than that likely to occur  in the normal
ebb and flow of business.  (ADA 1989,  p.1)
On the question of the causal link, the ADA stated its interpretation of the government's
position as follows:
The government  expects  that material  injury,  or the threat thereof,  will  only rarely  be taken
as proven when the Australian  industry  producing  like goods has not suffered, or is not
threatened  with, a 'material'  diminution  of profits or when  the dumped  imports  do not hold
(or threaten  to hold)  a sufficient  share  of the  market  to cause  or threaten  'material'  injury.
However, the Authority did not exclude the possibility that material injury might (in 'rare
cases') be found where neither of those conditions held.
Nevertheless the current procedures relating to injury appear to be considerably tighter in
their application than under the previous administrative arTangements.  This is illustrated
by a simple statistical comparison: of 22 anti-dumping cases terminated in ! 984-85, only
five (or 23 per cent) were because of failure to pass the injury or causality test; in 1988-
89, the first recorded year in which the new regime applied, this had risen to 70 per cent.
Anti-dumping  measures
The GATT Code provides that where dumped goods are found to have caused material
injury to an industry, the government is entitled (though not required) to impose duties
which (a) 'must not exceed the margin of dumpi.g  ...' and (b) should be 'less than the
margin,  if  such  lesser  duty  would  be  adequate  to  remove  the  injury'  (Article  8).
Alternatively,  the government may accept 'voluntary'  price undertakings of the same
magnitude from the supplier.50
Australian practice has been that most cases have involved duties, rather than price
undertakings  (table 8). In conuist to other countries, the duties are not fixed, but are
calculated  for each shipment  so as to raise  the import  price to the declared  nonnal  value  or
(lower)  non-injurious  level.
Table 8: Anti-dumping  measures  applied
Year  D)uties  Undertakings
1979-80  27  1
1980-81  21  2
1981-82  18  8
1982-83  46  11
1983-84  36  5
1984-85  15  3
1985-86  21  6
1986-87  3  1
1987-88  6  1
1988-89  10  5
Source:  Australian  Customs  Service
The IAC  has made  the following  observation  about  this approach:
Many  exporters  react  to the  imposition  of anti-dumping  dutes by  increasing  the  fob  price  of
the imported  good  until it is equal  to the 'floor  price' established  by the normal  value,
thereby  avoiding  the  imposition  of anti-dumping  duties.  Where  this  happens,  Australia  loses
income  which  it would  not lose if the reduction  in imports  were brought  about  by an
increase  in tariffs'  (Carmichael,  1986,  p.10).
While  this implicit  criticism  is justified  if the  objective  is to protect  the local industry  from
import competition in the lowest cost way, the Australian approach is nevertheless
consistent with the GAITs  anti-dumping  objective of achieving  'fair' import prices.
Foreign exporters  are given every chance of setting their prices 'fairly', at least cost to
them. (This explains the low incidence of formal undertakings.)  In this respect, the
Australian scheme is more flexible and 'exporter friendly' than that of the EC, for
example  (see Norall 1986).
Moreover,  in Australia  anti-dumping  procedures  have also not been used as a lever for
negotiatir.  g separate  voluntary  restraint  agreements,  as appears to have occurred  in the51
United  States.  (Finger  and  Murray, 1989)  Price  undertakings  must be made in the context
of the anti-dumping  procedures and require the prior determination of the dumping
margin,  on which  they  must be based.
VS  here large dumping margins are found, the administration, in line with GATT
requirements,  has often determined  a lower  floor  price which  in its judgment  is sufficient
to prevent injury (the so-called  'non-injurious  free on board' value or NIFOB).  The Act
provides no guidance as to how this might be done and judgments must inevitably be
made on the basis of local manufacturers'  evidence  and advice.  NIFOBs  are therefore,  as
Gruen suggests, more likely to err on the high side. Gruen estimates that NIFOBs
accounted  for about 10 per cent  of duties  in place  in 1986  and 40 per cent  of undertakings
(p.29).
As both Gruen and the IAC point out, NIFOBs do not compensate for excessive
estimates  of dumping  margins  - often based  on constructed,  or third party,  prices.
This is illustrated  in the Commission's  anti-dumping  report  on Dining  Candles  from  the
Peoples'  Republic  of China.  Customs  had  determined  that  the dumping  margins  assessed
using  Malaysian  normal  values  were  higher  than  necessary  to redress  injury  suffered  by the
Australian  industry.  A single  nifob  value,  up  to 42 per  cent  below  the  three  assessed  normal
values  for Malaysia,  was established  as the  basis  for dumping  duties.  Had  normal  values
initially  been  assessed  for the 'preferred'  third  country,  Hong Kong  (as was done in a
subsequent  review)  these  normal  values  would  have  been  significantly  lower  than  the  nifob
value  initially  used.  (Carmichael  1986,  p.7)
Once anti-dumping  measures  have been imposed,  there is a statutory  requirement  that
such actions be reviewed  and monitored.  In practice,  since import prices will typically
have been increased  to the designated  floor levels, a review is faced with making the
difficult judgment as to how prices would move if the floor level were removed.  This
could account for the apparent reluctance of Customs to engage in  reviews as
programmed,  referred to in the IAC  submission,  and there is little  doubt that  many of the
active anti-dumping  measures  in force through  the eighties were no longer  justified. A
number  of examples  have been  given  from IAC  inquiries.  Further  evidence  is the sudden
rash of revocations from 1985 and the relatively small number of renewed petitions,
referred  to previously.52
Long  term anti-dumping  measures  can have  two  possible  effects:
*  the exporter's  best price could become  progressively  lower than the floor price, as
costs and  prices of certain  goods  decline  over time (electronics  are a good  example),
thus  increasing  the protective  effect;
*  alternatively,  world-wide  inflation  could  eventually  make the floor price  redundant  as
a restriction  on foreign  imports.
Which  of these  has happened  in the Australian  case  is a matter  for speculation.
Transparency
The GATT requires that the basis for anti-dumping  decisions  be known to the parties
involved  and that  there be avenues  of appeal.  The procedures  themselves,  as summarised
in figure 2, are intended  to ensure  that the parties  have adequate  opportunity  to put their
case and scrutinise decisions. Australian  procedures have not been challenged in the
GATT  for failing  to meet the transparency  requirements  of Article  VI and the Code.
Nevertheless,  the Chairman  of the IAC  levelled  the following  criticism  at the system  in
his submission  to the Gruen  Review:
The present  administrative  system  is relatively  closed.  While  meetings  of parties  are
convened  by Customs  the rationale  for  decisions  is generally  not  made  public.  Many  of the
facts  on which  decisions  are  based  remain  confidential  and  the rates  of cash  securities  and
dumping  duties  imposed  on imports  are  in many  instances  also  confidential.  There  is not
even  a guarantee  that  the  application  of anti-dumping  action  to a particular  class  of good  will
be made  public.  The  creation  of a more  open  system  of administration  is a pre-requisite  for
well  informed  decision  making.  (Carmichael  1986,  p. 15)
These  charges  are partly explicable  in the context  of the difference  between  the economy-
wide information  and public  scrutiny  which  characterises  the IiC  system (discussed  in
box 1) and the more limited transparency  that the law requires of the anti-dumping
process. Where  decisions  are based  by law on considerations  relating  only to a particular
domestic  industry  and the foreign  exporter,  it is perhaps  inevitable  that  these interests  are
the best catered  for.53
Even within that system,  however,  Australia's  anti-dumping  procedures  and laws could
be made  considerably  more transparent  Gruen  commented  that
The  Act  itself  shows  all the  signs  of having  had  amendments  grafted  on top  of amendments.
Unrelated  clauses  sit  side  by side  and  related  clauses  are  widely  separated  (p.39).
He suggested  the rewriting  of the Act, with explicit  definitions  of a number  of key terms.
The fact is that anti-dumping  is in practice  not  just a contest  between  the foreign  exporter
and the local producer.  Domestic  consumers  and other industries  are vitally affected  -
even if their interests cannot be directly taken into account.  It is important  in terms of
providing at least some external scrutiny of the system that as much information  as
possible  is made generally  available  - not only on particular  cases, but also  on the larger
picture.
Under  the present arrangements  some steps  have been made in this direction.  The ACS
annual report now contains tables showing trends in the composition,  outcome and
incidence  of anti-dumping  (and countervailing)  activity,  including  by industry.  And the
ADA reports generally  provide a coherent  discussion  of the issues in its inquiries  and
how decisions were arrived  at. (As already indicated,  its report on material  injury and
other  matters  is particularly  informative.)
One  of Gruen's  recommendations  which  has not been  acted  on was that all normal  values
and NIFOBs should be published. In  principle the  Act allows  this,  subject to
confidentiality  requirements.  In practice  the parties  immediately  involved  have vetoed  it
on that basis - as it is alleged that publication would provide competitors with
commercially  relevant  information  about  production  costs.
Prior to 1984,  appeal procedures  involved  the IAC and permitted  that body to provide
some information on the broader effects on the Australian economy of taking anti-
dumping  action.  The 1984  changes  ruled  out IAC  consideration  of economy-wide  effects
and since 1988 the IAC has been displaced  from the system by the ADA. The Federal
Court  provides  a higher level  of appeal  - but again  oily in relation  to 'the facts'.54
V. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Anti-dumping in  Australia has been through a major cycle over the past decade,
eloquently  depicted  in figure  4 above.  The analysis  in this report suggests  thlat  that cycle
has had more to do with  domestic  economic  conditions  and the degree  of permissiveness
in anti-dumping  rules and their  interpretation  than  with dumping  as such.
In the past few years, more buoyant  domestic  economic  conditions  and the diminished
Australian  dollar have  reduced  the demand  for anti-dumping,  while legislative  and other
changes  to the system have  simultaneously  reduced  the supply. Compared  with our own
past and other  countries'  present,  Australia  is much less  of an anti-dumping  activist  than  it
was. The question  is whether  this will continue.  The foregoing  analysis  raises a number
of basic  issues which  have a bearing  on that.
For one thing,  it is clear that  the anti-dumping  system  retains  a degree  of administrative  or
ministerial  discretion  which will always  make it vulnerable  to the business  cycle  and the
political  cycle.  That is not  just an Australian  characteristic:  it is common  to the nature  of
the anti-dumping  process wherever  it may be found.  The Australian  government  has at
least  wrestled  fairly  publicly  with it to obtain  some  greater  precision  and objectivity.  And
in some areas improvements  have been made. But on the three touchstones  of the anti-
dumping  process - normal values, material injury and causality - there are many points
at which arbitrary  judgments will always need to be made, as long as there is an anti-
dumping  system.  It is inevitable  that those  judgments  will be coloured  by the political  and
economic climate of the day. Compared to the early 1980s, the present climate is
relatively  'dry'-  but that can change  again.
The fact that anti-dumping  is a complex  process with many rules which, depending  on
interpretation  or minor  changes,  can have important  differential  effects  on the fortunes  of
Australian industries,  means that the system and how it operates will remain  of abiding
interest to import-competing industries. Lobbying for rule changes, or favourable
interpretations,  will continue  as long as the expected  return from such lobbying  exceeds
the cost. Recent  events  in Australia  suggest  that  that  continues  to be the case.55
Regardless  of whether  anti-dumping  has served  as a protectionist  device in Australia,  it is
clear that industry sees it in that role. The Gruen Report  and the recent  ADA review  of
key concepts  provide sufficient evidence of that. For example, industry argued in the
latter review that market conditions in Australia should be taken into account in
constructing f..reign exporters' normal values. And on the national interest issue,
industry's position could not have been more unequivocal: 'Dumping should be
considered  as a corporate  and not a country  activity and national  interest should  play no
part' (Stubbs 1989).
Rent-seeking  efforts in the anti-dumping  arena are also influenced  by relative costs and
benefits.  It is now quite difficult  for industries  to obtain  the sort of conventional  border
protection  that was common  a decade  ago. Policy has been set in a liberalising  direction;
that is now widely understood and accepted. 'Protection' has become a discredited
concept  in Australia.  But, as in the United  States and elsewhere,  'fairness'  will always be
popular.  And 'anti-dumping'  by the very term  is seen to be about  achieving  fairness.
Moreover, anti-dumping  has the attraction of being a 'low track' route for obtaining
protection against imports, as Finger, Hall and Nelson (1982) have explained in the
American  context.  It takes place according  to rules and procedures  which industry  and
specialist consultants soon master, away from the public glare. The IAC route, by
contrast, is  'high track', costly to claimants and more likely to meet persuasive
opposition.
Thus the demand  for anti-dumping  as a protectionist  device will continue  and it can be
expected  to rise again when times  'get tough'.  In the past, the supply  of anti-dumping  has
to some  extent  been responsive  to that  demand.  Whether  that occurs in the future  hinges
in part on the new  Anti-dumping  Authority.
It seems  clear that the Anti-Dumping  Authority  has brought  a fresh and more  critical  eye
to the anti-dumping  process in Australia and in particular  has tightened  up on how the
injury est is implemented  in practice,  as well as providing  a second  careful pass at the
normal value arithmetic.  On a number  of occasions  its assessments  have differed from
those of Customs, and generally  in a direction that is more sympathetic  to the foreign
exporter.  However,  it could be argued  that these  positive  developments  have more  to do56
with the government's  current  attitude  than  with the institutional  innovation  as such. The
ADA essentially  operates within the same industry-specific  framework,  following the
same criteria, as the Customs  Service. If there is a difference  in perspective,  it results
from the fact that, in the words  of a representative  of the ADA, the Authority  'stands  in
the Minister's shoes'. It is thus more attuned to the political environment in which
'technical'  decisions  are made.  But that  can cut both ways.
There is ample evidence  from the Australian  experience  to suggest  that, while dumping
may sometimes be a problem in international trade, anti-dumping presents greater
problems.  Tinkering  with the procedures  and criteria  for taking  anti-dumping  action  can
help reduce its protectionist tendencies to some extent (although such changes are
reversible). But it does not resolve the fundamental  problem that anti-dumping  is at
bottom about safeguarding  the interests  of particular  industries.  As long as this remains
the objective,  there will always  be tension  between  anti-dumping  policy  and the broader
interests  of the national  economy  and the world  tading system.57
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